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The Sichuan (China) and L‟Aquila (Italy) earthquakes again highlighted the 
question of our preparedness for natural hazards. Within a few seconds an earthquake 
can demolish many buildings, destroy infrastructure, and kill and injure thousands of 
people. In order to reduce the impact of earthquakes on human life and prepare 
hospitals to cope with future disasters, this paper discusses earthquake related damage 
to healthcare facilities. It investigates the damage to 34 healthcare facilities in seven 
countries caused by nine earthquakes between 1994 and 2004, in order to determine 
common and specific issues. The investigation shows that structural and architectural 
damage tended to be different and specific to the situation, while utility supplies and 
equipment damage were similar in most cases and some common trends emerged. 
INTRODUCTION 
Earthquakes have always been a threat to human life and a major cause for damage to 
infrastructure. Previous earthquakes have resulted in physical damage, threatened lives and 
damaged healthcare facilities whose main function is to save lives and reduce the impact of 
disasters. Hospital resilience (i.e. strength and robustness) has always been important, but in 
recent years exclusive attention has been given to this subject specifically after the World Health 
Organization (WHO, 2008) and the United Nation International Strategy for Disaster Reduction 
(UNISDR) world campaign „Hospitals Safe From Disasters‟; the World Health Day (7 April 
2009) and the International Day for Disaster Reduction (14 October 2009). “There are countless 
examples of health infrastructure — from sophisticated hospitals to small but vital health centres 
— that have suffered this fate. One such case occurred in the Hospital Juarez in Mexico. In 
1985, almost 600 patients and staff lost their lives when this modern (for its time) and well-
equipped hospital collapsed in the wake of an earthquake” (WHO, 2007a). Literature and 
experience reveal that healthcare discontinuity is common following earthquakes; but it is not 
very clear what the causes of discontinuity are. The present paper discusses the causes of hospital 
inoperability in several countries with the aim of identifying the impact of earthquakes on the 
continuity of healthcare. The objectives are to explore the significance and performance of 
healthcare facilities in disasters; scrutinize the legislations and standards for healthcare resilience 
to earthquakes; and compare healthcare facilities response to earthquakes. 
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METHODOLGY 
Data collection 
This study adopted a pluralistic qualitative research method defined as a systematic, empirical 
strategy for eliciting responses from people in a special social context; and is concerned with 
information less understood by calculation (Fellows and Liu, 2003). A state of the art literature 
review, including research papers and reconnaissance reports were performed to identify and 
explore the key factors affecting the operation of medical facilities. Legislations for seismic 
resistant design and governmental and non-governmental guidance were also reviewed to 
identify laws and practices to mitigate seismic effect. Field investigations and interviews with 
hospital staff (clinical and administrative) were used to comprehensively explore the key 
factors affecting the operation of healthcare facilities. Between July 2003 and November 2005, 
ten hospitals located in three countries were investigated following four earthquakes (see Table 
1). The information was complemented with two in-depth interviews (in May 2009) with 
experts from earthquake engineering, and disaster risk management to find the lessons learned 
from past earthquakes and actions undertaken to mitigate with future events. 
Classification of hospital key factors 
Healthcare key factors are often classified into two categories: physical and social. The 
physical category includes structural and non-structural parts; whilst the social category 
encompasses staff and administrative parts (e.g. partnership with other organizations). The focus 
of this paper is on the physical category, the social category will be considered in future work. 
“The structural parts of a building are those that resist gravity, earthquakes, wind and other 
types of loads; they include columns; beams and foundations”; and “the non-structural parts 
include all parts of the building and its contents with the exception of the structure” they “are 
composed of: lifeline facilities; medical facilities; and architectural elements” (DoHS/WHO 
Nepal, 2004). Although this classification is clear and follows a logical philosophy, it does not 
provide clear information when describing non-structural damage; for example, in one of the 
reports we read: “…many of these structures had equipment and non-structural damage, 
resulting in extended business interruptions” (Miyamoto, et al., 2009), this statement does not 
describe whether the damage is related to utilities, architectural or other items. Furthermore, the 
European Microseismic Scale (EMS-98, 1998) involves architectural and structural components 
in the same category when assessing the damage to buildings. In this paper, components are 
classified into three categories: structural and architectural; equipment; and utilities. This 
classification does not compromise the importance of healthcare system components (structural 
and non-structural), “both the structural system and most of the non-structural systems are 
required to perform without interruption after an earthquake to enable adequate functionality” 
(FEMA, 2007); instead, it provides clearer information about the type of damage, which helps 
the perceiver to understand what is the impact on hospital operation and who is expected to be 
involved in the repairs. 
Table 1. List of Hospitals investigated 
Earthquake/Country Date Investigation date Hospitals visited 
Boumerdes/Algeria 21 May 2003 July 2003 CHU and Thenia 
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Miyagi-Ken 
Hokubu/Japan 
26 July 2003 August 2003 Fukaya and Kashimadai 
Bam/Iran 
26 December 
2003 
February 2004 
and 
September 2005 
Imam Khomeini and 
Aflatoonian 
Niigata Chuetsu/Japan 23 October 2004 November 2004 
Ojiya; Uonuma; Tamiya; and 
Nakajo 
 
There are significant numbers of case studies illustrating the performance of healthcare 
facilities after earthquakes; however, difficulty finding complete information was the main 
reason to limit the cases to thirty four hospitals as shown in Table 2. Unfortunately, there is 
limited information about the recent performance of Chinese and Italian facilities following the 
2008 Sichuan and 2009 L‟Aquila earthquakes, although Miyamoto et al. (2009) and EEFIT 
(2009) reported that recently built hospital buildings were damaged. 
Table 2. List of investigated hospitals and their relevant earthquakes 
Code Name of hospital Name of Earthquake Source of information 
NR1 Northridge Hospital 
1994 Northridge 
Earthquake,  
California, USA 
(Pickett, 1997); 
(Young, 1995); 
(USGS, 1996); and 
(McKevitt, et al., 
1995) 
NR2 Olive View Hospital 
NR3 Holy Cross Medical Center 
NR4 
Veteran‟s Administration 
Hospital (building #3) 
NR5 
LA County Medical Center 
(mental health building) 
NR6 St John‟s Hospital 
NR7 
USC Medical Center (USC 
hospital building) 
NR8 
Granada Hills Community 
Hospital 
HN1 
Medical College of Kobe 
University 
1995 Hyogo-Nambu 
Earthquake, Japan 
(Shinozuka, et al., 
1995); (Schiff, 1998); 
and (Ukai, 1996)  HN2 Hyogo Medical Center 
KC1 Izmit SSK 
1999 Kocaeli Earthquake, 
Turkey 
(Pickett, 2003); 
(Rodoplu, 2000); and 
(Scawthorn, 2000)  
KC2 Izmit State 
KC3 Adapazari SSK 
KC4 Adapazari State 
CC1 Christian Hospital 
1999 Chi-Chi Earthquake, 
Taiwan 
(Yao and Chuang, 
2001); (Soong and 
Yao, 2000); and 
(Soong, et al., 2000)  
CC2 Veteran Hospital 
CC3 Shiun-Tuan Hospital 
BH1 Civil Hospital 
2001 Bhuj Earthquake, 
India 
(WHO, 2001); and 
(Sharma, 2001)  
BH2 Jubilee Hospital 
BH3 Branch Hospital 
BH4 Mental Hospital 
BH5 Nursing School Hospital 
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BH6 ANM Training School 
BH7 Tuberculosis Centre 
BM1 CHU Centre Hospital 2003 Boumerdes 
Earthquake, Algeria 
Field investigation  
BM2 Thenia Hospital 
MH1 Fukaya Hospital 2003 Miyagi-Ken Hokubu 
Earthquake, Japan MH2 Kashimadai Hospital 
IR1 Aflatoonian Hospital 
2003 Bam Earthquake, Iran 
IR2 Imam Khomeini Hospital 
NG1 Ojiya Hospital 
2004 Niigata Earthquake, 
Japan 
NG2 Uonuma Hospital 
NG3 Tamiya Hospital 
NG4 Nakajo Hospital 
SIGNIFICANCE AND PERFORMANCE OF HOSPITALS IN EARTHQUAKES 
Significance of hospitals following earthquakes 
Medical facilities are one of the most critical facilities in any country, along with facilities 
such as fire departments and police stations. Hospitals are distinctive, however, due to the critical 
role they play in dealing with the large number of injuries typically associated with large-scale 
disasters such as earthquakes. Ninety seven percent (97%) of earthquake related injuries occur 
within the first 30 minutes following the main shock (Gunn, 1995). This urged organizations 
such as the WHO (2007a) to insist that healthcare facilities “must be physically resilient and able 
to remain operational and continue providing vital health services” following disasters to 
guarantee immediate medical treatment. Events such as the 2005 Kashmir and the 2008 Sichuan 
earthquakes caused enormous number of injuries requiring hospitals with large capacity, which 
was a problem in many cases such as in Taiwan during the 1999 Chi-Chi Earthquake (Soong and 
Yao, 2000). Hospital occupancy is generally high due to the existence of a large number of 
patients, visitors, medical staff and other employees at the same time (PAHO, 1993) in addition 
to the length of stay, which depends on the severity and type of injuries (including patients with 
mental disorders). A sample of 1,502 earthquake related injuries demonstrated that 31% of 
patients had to be admitted to hospital, 64.9% were identified with superficial laceration, 22.2% 
with fractures, and 1% with abdominal injuries requiring debridement and closure under general 
anesthesia, multiple concurrent procedures and urgent laparotomy (Mulvey, et al., 2008). In 
other words, all medical departments must be resilient enough to cope with earthquakes and 
provide diagnosis and treatment to injuries. Although, designing a healthcare facility to be 
resilient to hurricanes and earthquakes does not cost more than 4.5% extra on top of the total 
facility cost (Gibbs, 2007), many facilities are not designed to withstand such disasters. 
Performance of healthcare facilities following earthquakes 
Physical performance 
Published reports and papers reflect significant information about hospital performance in 
earthquakes varying between total collapse and fully operational. The Pan American Health 
Organization (PAHO, 2000) described a hospital as “a hotel, an office building, a laboratory and 
a warehouse” due to the complexity and interconnectivity of its systems. A typical healthcare 
facility depends on the state of its building; continuity of its utility supplies; availability and 
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sufficiency of staff, equipment and medical supply; and easy accessibility for its daily operation. 
The failure of any of these components affects the continuity of medical care. Despite the level 
of knowledge humanity has reached, easy access to information and considerable reports stating 
the experience of previous hospitals many hospital buildings are still very fragile to earthquakes: 
the 1995 Hyogo-Nambu Earthquake (Japan) severely damaged 61% of hospitals in disaster area 
and completely destroyed four facilities (Ukai, 1996); the 2005 Kashmir Earthquake (Pakistan) 
destroyed 50% of hospitals in stricken area raging from “sophisticated” to “rural” facilities 
(WHO EMRO, 2009); and the collapse of many hospitals and schools caused over 10,000 deaths 
following the 2008 Sichuan Earthquake in China (Miyamoto, et al., 2009). Structural behavior 
influences the response of non-structural components as most of them are connected to structure, 
which transfers earthquake forces onto them (WHO SEARO, 2002). For example, the failure of 
St. John‟s Hospital non-structural walls caused the rupture of water lines following the 1994 
Northridge Earthquake in the USA (Pickett, 1997); whilst the Christian and Shiu-Tuan hospitals 
suffered slight structural damage but severe utility and equipment damage during the 1999 Chi-
Chi Earthquake in Taiwan (Soong and Yao, 1999). Many healthcare facilities have not been 
sufficiently physically resilient to cope with earthquakes, although some facilities withstood the 
shaking due to their base isolation systems which helped to perform well such as the University 
of South California (USC) Medical Center (Pickett, 1997).  
“Seismic isolation is a technology that protects the structure by effectively decoupling the 
structure from the damaging effects of the earthquake” (Constantinou, et al., 2007). Seismic 
isolation performance and efficiency come from the radical modification of the building seismic 
response due to: the elongated fundamental period of the structure; the small drift that the 
building experiences; and the reduction of overall forces (Constantinou, et al., 2007), “thus the 
deflections and stresses generated in a base-isolated structure are significantly lower than those 
of a fixed-base one” (Su, et al., 1989); for example, the USC Medical Center building forces 
were reduced by 65% across the plane of isolation and there was no damage in the facility (Di 
Sarno, et al., 2007). Base isolators, therefore, provide a higher and more efficient performance to 
buildings than seismic codes demand; this classifies them as an „ideal‟ solution for critical 
facilities such as hospitals. 
Social performance 
In Japan, following the 1995 Hyogo-Nambu Earthquake, “the attendance rate of personnel in 
hospitals on the first day of the disaster was 58.4% for physicians, 35.0% for dentists, 44.2% for 
nurses, and 31.0% for clerical staff. In the first hours, when the hospitals in the disaster area 
were extremely busy, less than 50% of personnel were able to attend their hospitals” (Ukai, 
1996) due to reasons such as road damage, being among earthquake victims or having a relative 
trapped in rubble. Furthermore, personnel who remain at their duties post earthquakes were 
susceptible to stress and psychological disorders and may need to be treated by mental health 
professionals along with earthquake victims (Uemoto, et al., 1996). Awareness is adopted as a 
way to reduce stress and help medical staff to deliver high quality medical service. At present, 
many facilities throughout the globe are provided with emergency manuals (EMs) and regular 
trainings, to reduce stress and help towards a better emergency response. These manuals are 
often prepared based on previous experience and best practices; actions may vary between 
medical departments and type of disaster but they usually consider pre-, during and post disaster 
actions. To help with pre-disaster activities, Hirouchi (2009) recommends the use of Earthquake 
Early Warning (EEW) systems in hospitals to “prevent surgical errors, e.g., stopping surgery 
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and moving equipment away from the patient within the few seconds after the EEW”. A number 
of publications focused on hospital evacuation strategies such as in Schultz et al. (2003) who 
suggested that even after a moderate earthquake, hospitals may need to evacuate immediately 
because of non-structural or delayed structural damage. The aforementioned initiatives are 
important for staff resuming duties, but a major problem is how to increase the number of 
attendees among staff members? This requires further investigation and shall be considered in 
future work. 
LEGISLATIONS AND STANDARDS FOR HEALTHCARE RESILIENCE TO 
EARTHQUAKE 
Impact of previous experience 
“If we see the technology and political system, particularly after Kobe Earthquake, a lot of 
financial resources were allocated for disaster prevention…it is amazing!” stated one of the 
interviewees commenting on the impact of previous disasters on Japanese disaster prevention. 
The poor performance of medical facilities pushed researchers, engineers and decision makers to 
investigate in depth the causes of failure and take decisions to mitigate future risks. 
Consequently, new techniques were developed and implemented, and thus protected structural 
and non-structural components from failure. Interestingly, the implementation of base isolation, 
for example, ensures the continuity of medical services with relatively low cost: the Chilean 
Military Hospital spent 0.9% ($US1million) of the total hospital cost for the installation of its 
base isolation (Boroschek and Retamales, 2002). A week after the 1995 Hyogo-Nambu 
Earthquake, the WHO Kobe Centre was opened despite the “wrenching trauma” of the event, 
this was highly admired by the WHO and is perceived as a contribution “to health research as 
meaningful investment” (WHO Kobe Centre, 2007). Despite this significant improvement in 
techniques and practices, many newly built Chinese schools and hospitals collapsed following 
the 2008 Sichuan Earthquake, mainly due to poor design and poor structure quality thus killing 
thousands of people (Miyamoto, et al., 2009); and the inadequate detailing and irregularities in 
design were the cause of the 9 year old L‟Aquila Hospital to suffer severe damage in Italy 
following the 2009 L‟Aquila Earthquake (EEFIT, 2009). These cases show that there are 
strategic problems and authorities are urged to make sure that codes are up to date and enforced 
in practice. Countries such as Turkey realized this and started conducting comprehensive 
retrofitting activities to reduce the vulnerability and enhance the resilience of their infrastructure 
including hospitals, school and bridges (IPDED, 2007).  
Legislations 
“The purpose of building codes is to promote and protect the public welfare” (Hamburger, 
2002), thus they are designed to provide a guide for engineers and designers; and are supported 
by legislations for enforcement. The enforcement of codes is crucial for the resilience of 
buildings, many countries such as Algeria, Japan and Taiwan recognized the importance of code 
enforcement for the protection of welfare: interviewees stated that Japanese and Taiwanese 
“building codes were improved in terms of implementation as we believe that structural design 
was strong enough to cope with earthquakes”, and the Algerian code RPA 99 (2003) recognizes 
that code implementation and poor construction quality are the cause of damage to new buildings 
after the 2003 Boumerdes Earthquake. Code implementation can be done by enforcing the 
designers and architects to follow the law, but also it can be done by spreading awareness. For 
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example, Taiwanese authorities use awareness and legislations to push architects and contractors 
to design and construct resilient buildings; one of the interviewees stated that at present, 
architects and contractors “are more willing to comply with seismic detail and willing to pay 
more attention to what structural engineers suggest”. 
Most codes focus exclusively on structural components and when non-structural components are 
considered, they are limited to architectural, mechanical and electrical components (FEMA, 
2007); although these components are important, they are not sufficient to ensure the operation 
of hospitals. The investigation of Algerian (RPA 99, 2003), Iranian (BHRC, 2007), European 
(EuroCode 8, 2005) and Californian (SB 1953, 1994) codes demonstrates that the level of 
exposure to seismic activities and the quality of post earthquake hospital investigations were 
clear on the development of these codes. The 2003 Boumerdes (Algeria) and the 2003 Bam 
(Iran) earthquakes caused structural and non-structural damage to hospitals, yet the RPA 99 and 
the Iranian standards consider only structural and architecture resistance although they were 
updated recently, after these events. The investigation established that the Californian code is the 
most comprehensive amongst all investigated codes because it went through a long history of 
improvement and modification (see Table 3). Engineering investigations after the 1971 San 
Fernando Earthquake demonstrated that seismic forces in the Veteran‟s Administration (VA) 
Hospital site were under-estimated by codes (Holmes, 1976); and that the proper detailing and 
the beneficial effects of nonlinear soil-structure interaction helped one structure to withstand 
damage, although two neighboring structures collapsed (Rutenberg, et al., 1980). As a result of 
this earthquake, the first „Hospital Seismic Safety Act‟ was developed (California Seismic Safety 
Commission, 2001), with a focus on structural and nonstructural resistance (Meehan, 1984); however, the 
1994 Northridge Earthquake demonstrated that the Act was successful in protecting structures but damage 
to non-structural components, such as plumbing and ceiling systems, was still extensive in post-1973 
buildings (California Seismic Safety Commission, 2001). The Act was amended by Senate Bill 1953 after 
the Northridge Earthquake to require seismic evaluations; if hospitals were then found to have structural 
or nonstructural vulnerabilities, retrofits or replacements were also required. In essence, the legislation in 
California has been developed on lessons learned from previous experience and reflected the complexity 
of hospitals systems. There is a need therefore for other regions of the world that are threatened by 
earthquakes to develop and enforce hospital resilience legislation based in part on lessons learned from 
Iran, Algeria, Japan, Taiwan, California and other regions. 
Assessment methodologies 
There are two types of assessment, pre- and post-disaster. Post-disaster assessment is carried 
out for safety reasons and is done in several countries differently. For example, in Japan and 
California a three-level damage tagging system: “Inspected”, “Limited Entry” and “Unsafe” 
(FEMA, 2007); and in Algeria, authorities adopted a five-level assessment scale to assess 242 
facilities as shown in Table 4. The pre-disaster assessment defines vulnerabilities to enhance 
authorities, managers and engineers‟ decision to retrofit and reduce risk of damage. The 
application of assessment defines the assessment methodology (AM) to follow, which can be 
qualitative or quantitative based on observed vulnerability, expert opinions, simple analytical 
models, score assignment or detailed analysis procedure (Lang, 2002). There are many AMs, 
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some of which are generic and others are specific for healthcare facilities: Johnson et al. (1999) 
suggest a scoring generic methodology based on defining systems, evaluating individual 
components and systems; the WHO (2006, 2007b) and the PAHO (2008) suggest preliminary 
assessment methods based on visual screening combined with screener opinion; and Achour 
(2007) suggests also a hospital focused methodology based on modeling and simulation 
combined with theoretical models and case studies. Unlike codes and legislation AMs are not 
obligatory for facilities; thus there is a risk that they will be neglected. The previous section 
underlined problems of „code‟ implementation; there is a need therefore to investigate how to 
encourage hospital managers to evaluate the performance of their facilities. 
Table 3. Seismic codes and legislations 
Code/legislation 
 
Structural 
elements 
Architectural and 
filling components 
Equipment 
and Utilities 
Retrofittin
g 
Comments 
SB 1953 
(California) 
√ √ √ √ 
Specific for 
hospitals 
Iranian 3
rd
 
Edition 2007 
√ √ - - Generic 
RPA 99 V2003 
(Algeria) 
√ √ - - Generic 
EuroCode 8 
(French Edition) 
√ √ - - Generic 
 
COMPARISON OF HEALTHCARE PERFORMANCE POST EARTHQUAKES 
Structural and architectural components 
The European Microseismic Scale 98 (EMS-98, 1998) classifies damage to buildings into 
five grades as shown in Table 5. Wenzel et al. (2008) allocated to each grade a “damage ratio” 
and a “central damage factor (CDF)” expressed in percentage of structural and architectural 
damage. Grades 1 and 2 do not present a threat to the structure and therefore their severity is 
assumed as „Slight‟; Grade 3 presents a threat to structure which may affect the operation of the 
facility, its severity is „Moderate‟. The last two grades illustrate a severe damage; or a total 
collapse, their severity is assumed as „Major‟. Hospital structural and architectural damage data 
were distilled from various sources (see Table 2), and damage severity was classified according 
to Table 5. The severity of damage was classified descriptively, through the description of 
previous investigations to structural/architectural damage, and visually, through the site visits 
carried following each event. 
Table 4. Algerian post-earthquake assessment scale 
Level Description Number of facilities 
Green 1 Displacement of furniture, equipment 37% 
Green 2 Slight damage to non-structural elements 36% 
Orange 3 
Slight damage to structural elements and severe damage to 
non-structural elements 
14% 
Orange 4 
Considerable damage to structural elements 
Very severe damage to non-structural elements 
9% 
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Cracks on X shape for RC walls, bursting of joint beam-
column 
 
Red 5 
Total collapse 
Very severe deformation  
Repair cost higher than the building itself 
4% 
 
 
 
Most of the investigated facilities went through structural and or architectural damage, the 
severity varied from slight to major (see Table 6). One of the interviewees stated that, following 
the 1999 Chi-Chi Earthquake, “failed structures were mostly due to inappropriate design (old 
buildings did not have seismic design, new buildings had structural system problem of soft 
storey); construction flaw (the 135 degree stirrup hook is particularly difficult to construct); and 
inappropriate dismantling of structures (owners changed the structure system for remodeling)”. 
Poor construction quality has always been a major challenge, but when combined with the age of 
the structure and the lack of retrofitting the building cannot withstand earthquake shaking such as 
the case of the Thenia Hospital (BM2) which experienced severe damage during the 2003 
Boumerdes Earthquake. The facility comprises two sets of buildings: the first set includes several 
unreinforced masonry (URM) buildings built in 1870, never undergone anti-seismic retrofitting; 
whilst the second set includes a few buildings built in recent years (was not investigated). The 
Veteran‟s Administration Hospital complex comprises many buildings, some of which collapsed, 
whilst others performed well, during the 1971 San Fernando Earthquake, due to the proper 
detailing and “the beneficial effects of non-linear soil-structure interaction” (Rutenberg, et al., 
1980).  
Despite the significant amount of guidance to improve structural behavior, many recent 
facilities such as the Italian L‟Aquila and the Chinese Hanwang (9 years old) hospitals were 
damaged. Investigations concluded that irregularities (in plan and elevation), poor detailing (steel 
bars were exposed), and design (a beam is larger than columns) were the main reasons for 
L‟Aquila Hospital‟s structural failure (EEFIT, 2009); whilst lack of stiffness (i.e. soft storey) was 
the cause of the Hanwang facility post the 2008 Sichuan Earthquake (Miyamoto, et al., 2009). 
Furthermore, the impact of culture on the construction industry (Mahmood, et al., 2006, Ngowbi, 
2000) and the failure of implementing codes and standards increase the diversity of structural 
and architectural components resilience, which leads us to conclude that the structural and 
architectural performance depends on the state of each building (i.e. construction quality, design, 
site effects, code and guidance implementation and others). 
Table 5. Classification of damage severity 
Damage Grade (EMS-
98) 
Description 
Damage 
ratio (%) 
CDF 
(%) 
Severity 
Grade 1: Negligible to 
slight damage 
- No structural damage 
- Slight non-structural damage 
0-1 0.5 
Slight 
Grade 2: Moderate 
damage 
- Slight Structural damage 
- Moderate non-structural 
damage 
1-20 10 
Grade 3: Substantial to 
heavy damage 
- Moderate structural damage 
- Heavy non-structural damage 
20-60 40 Moderate 
Grade 4: Very heavy - Heavy structural damage 60-100 80 Major 
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damage - Very heavy non-structural 
damage 
Grade 5: Destruction - Very heavy structural damage 100 100 
Utility supplies 
Continued operation of healthcare facilities after earthquakes depends on utility systems, the 
majority are supplied from main grids and networks such as electric power, water supply and 
telecommunications. Previous experience has demonstrated that these grids and networks were 
damaged during earthquakes, and that their damage could initiate other disasters: for example, 
the 1923 Great Kanto Earthquake, Japan, resulted in a fire, which was in the main cause of 
deaths (Guest, 2004). Measures have been adopted to reduce secondary risks such as switching 
off mains supply automatically in earthquakes (ABS-Consulting, 2004). In both cases, damage 
and automatic switch off, the mains supplies are interrupted and thus affects the normal 
operation of medical facilities. Many of the investigated hospitals were provided with alternative 
sources to subsidize the loss of mains. Utilities performance depends on the integrity not only of 
these alternative sources but also of many related components such as pipelines, battery racks, 
electrical connections to control panels and mufflers (FEMA, 2009). Any damage to these 
components affects the continuity of medical supply as was found in many facilities (e.g. 
NR2&6, CC1-3, MH1 and NG1) and can cause the evacuation of facilities such as the Hyogo 
Medical Center (HN2). It is important to reduce the fragility of each system separately, but more 
importantly to reduce the interdependency of these systems on each other: the Olive View 
Medical Center (NR2) had to switch off its power generators due to loss of water used for its 
cooling system (Pickett, 1997). At present, many facilities are provided with less dependent 
backup systems such as the Aflatoonian Hospital (IR1) which benefits from a power generator 
with an air-cooling system (provided a year after the 2003 Bam Earthquake). This represents a 
significant improvement in backup systems manufacturing; however, ignoring utility systems 
resilience in codes and official guidance represents a major contribution to their fragility. Most 
of the investigated codes (Table 2) do not pay attention to utility systems resilience, except the 
SB 1953. Failing to include utility resilience in codes tends to disregard the importance of 
backup systems in facilities such was found in some facilities: BM1-2 and IR1 were not provided 
with any backup systems before the events. In conclusion, utilities could not perform after 
earthquakes whether the facility is provided with alternative sources or not. There is similarity 
between utility systems impact on healthcare facilities; however, the outcome of legislations 
such as SB 1953 and the recent seismic resistance systems (e.g. anti-sloshing tanks) cannot be 
proven until they go through a „real test‟, i.e. an earthquake. 
Equipment 
The continuity of medical services depends on having fully operational equipment to 
diagnose and treat injuries. Any damage or malfunction to equipment will result in low quality 
treatment, which in turn can threaten life. A study concluded that “manpower, medication and 
equipment for injuries of the knee, lower leg,…and injuries involving multiple body regions may 
be the most critically needed immediately after earthquakes” (Zhang, et al., 2009). “Equipment 
can become inoperable due to earthquake shaking even if it remains in place” (ATC, 2008) such 
as the Aflatoonian Hospital (IR1) radiology unit which was damaged because of internal 
mechanical/electrical problems. Achour et al. (2005) demonstrated that acceleration of 200-300 
cm/sec
2
 caused damage to 80% of diagnosis and 40% of treatment equipments in hospitals 
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following the 2004 Niigata-Ken Chuetsu Earthquake (Japan). Unstable equipment damages 
utility installations (Central Sterilization Room of IR1 damaged water pipelines); obstructs 
evacuation routes (Achour, 2007); causes serious injuries and can cause partial or total structural 
collapse (PAHO, 2000). Suggestions were to restrain equipment to reduce their damage (PAHO, 
2004), although researchers demonstrated that even anchored equipment get damaged, and 
suggest that it may be more stable if they are left free standing (Makris and Zhang, 1999). The 
response of equipment to earthquakes can be sliding, slide-rocking, rocking or flying (Housner, 
1963) depending on their geometry, static friction and ground acceleration (Shenton III, 1996), 
although, some researchers believe that frequency is also another factor that affects equipment 
stability (Achour, 2007).  
A characteristic of most healthcare equipment is the excessive use of casters for easy 
movement, which makes nurses tasks easier. Wheeled equipments are easy to move when 
subjected to very low accelerations (as small as 50cm/sec
2
); despite the chaotic movement, they 
stabilize in high accelerations and frequencies (Achour, et al., 2007). 
Building contents “are specifically exempted from seismic provisions in model building 
codes. Regulated by the code or not, contents can pose an additional risk to safety and continuity 
of operations after an earthquake…The seismic protection of contents is dependent upon an 
understanding of potential seismic risk followed by action to mitigate that risk on the part of 
business owners, homeowners, and tenants” (ATC, 2008). Considering that most codes do not 
consider equipment stability and that hospital equipments are similar throughout the world, 
equipment performance is expected to be similar in any facility. This investigation demonstrates 
that this is true as most facilities had problems with their equipments (see Table 6). The impact 
of the SB 1953 code on the performance of equipment, however, remains unknown until 
facilities falling under this legislation are tested.  
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
Previous earthquakes resulted in physical damage, threatened lives and damaged healthcare 
facilities, whose main function is to save lives and reduce the impact of disasters. The 
significance of hospitals lies with the enormous investment for any country: the destruction of a 
hospital and the cost of reconstruction impose a major economic burden; also with the significant 
number of injuries that they treat pre and post disasters. Despite the considerable number of 
assessment methodologies and the seismic resistance technologies, recent events demonstrated 
that hospitals are still vulnerable to seismic activities and that there are many challenges facing 
the continuity of medical service after earthquakes. The performance of healthcare facilities 
depends on the performance of both social and physical components; however, due to 
complexity of these two components and the interconnectivity they have, this study focused only 
on physical components. The investigations demonstrated that the structural and architectural 
components respond differently to earthquake shaking due to the diversity of causes and the 
specification of each building. On the other hand, the findings show that there is a similarity 
between equipment and utility supplies‟ damage because most facilities are equipped with 
similar equipments and installations that are not protected by codes. 
Most seismic resistance codes were developed universally for all types of buildings 
regardless of their occupancy. This resulted in a lack of attention to the specification of 
healthcare facilities and therefore unintentionally „contributing‟ to medical care interruption. 
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There is a need to develop seismic resistance codes for hospitals that provide guidelines for the 
structural and architectural elements (for new and existing buildings); the continuity of utility 
supplies; and the stability of equipments. The efficiency of codes depends on the method of their 
development and the effectiveness of their implementation. Codes should be based on scientific 
evidence (i.e. field investigation, theory and best practice) with consideration of the local culture 
of construction method, but most importantly, they must be provided with implementation and 
enforcement strategies. 
 The California legislation SB 1953 was based on previous experience and complexity of 
hospitals systems. It demonstrates how strict the authorities are to ensure the continuity of 
medical care in earthquakes. The legislation presents an important tool to enhance the physical 
resilience of hospitals but not the social resilience which may be a cause of medical care 
disruption. The literature review brought forward the importance of social resilience for the 
continuity of medical care; this will be investigated in more detail to find out what is the best 
way to enhance the social resilience and suggest methods to include in hospital codes. 
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Table 6. Summary of hospital damage caused by earthquakes 
Hospital 
Code 
PGA 
(cm/sec
2
) 
Structural Damage Lifeline Damage/malfunction Equipment Damage/Malfunction 
Slight Moderate Heavy Unknown Power Water Gas Tel. Anchored 
Free standing/ 
wheeled 
Unknow
n 
NR1 -            
NR2 910            
NR3 1000            
NR4 940            
NR5 490            
NR6 -            
NR7 490            
NR8 -            
HN1 -            
HN2 -            
KC1 225            
KC2 225            
KC3 400            
KC4 400            
CC1 560            
CC2 580            
CC3 480            
BH1 375
*
         Total collapse 
BH2 375
*
         Total collapse 
BH3 375
*
         Total collapse 
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BH4 375
*
         Total collapse 
BH5 375
*
            
BH6 375
*
            
BH7 375
*
            
BM1 340
*
            
BM2 580
**
            
MH1 -            
MH2 -            
IR1 870
***
            
IR2 870
*
         Total collapse 
NG1 790            
NG2 772            
NG3 510            
NG4 549            
* PGA recorded within the same city as hospital 
** PGA recorded 20km from hospital 
*** PGA recorded several kilometers from hospital 
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